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TRIENNIAL REVIEW: A NEW ERA FOR THE STATE-FEIDEAL
TELECOMMICATIONS PARTNERSHIP
Michael C. Engel*
I am making an eleventh hour request to encourage
you to allow the states needed jurisdiction over UNE-Ps.
Never in the past have states and the FCC had a greater
need for a complementary working relationship than
they have now. The Telecom Act of 1996 brought
about our strong working partnership. This is not the
time to take a step away and harness states with "one
size fits all" policies.'
On August 21, 2003, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission ("Commission") released its
long awaited Triennial Review Order which funda-
mentally changed the way the Commission and
state governments regulate local telephone com-
petition.2 This decision, which sets out a new
targeted fact-finding role for the states, signals a
new era of regulation which alters the way both
the Commission and the states gauge the ability of
competitors to enter the market without the use
of incumbent local exchange carrier ("LEC") fa-
cilities. In particular, where states previously were
able to expand the obligations of incumbent
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present the views of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion or the United States Government.
I Letter from Anne Boyle, Chair, Nebraska Public Service
Commission, to Jonathan Adelstein, Commissioner, Federal
Communications Commission (Feb. 14, 2003) (on file with
the author).
2 The Triennial Review proceeding was marked by deep
philosophical differences among the five commissioners, re-
suiting in a rare dissent from the Chairman, over which parts
of the incumbents' local network should be available to com-
petitive LECs. Christopher Stern & Jonathan Krim, Divided
FCC Set to Force 'Bells' to Keep Sharing; Powell Opposing States'
Phone Role, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2003, at El (describing the
controversy leading up to the Commission's Triennial Review
decision); see also Mark Wigfield, Leading the News: FCC Chief
Faces Deregulation Setback, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2003, at A3
(discussing the UNE-P controversy and the upcoming vote to
"give states more power to maintain current rules").
" See Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
LECs to make their networks available to competi-
tors for leasing at wholesale rates, states will now
apply Commission-defined triggers to determine
whether certain pieces of the incumbent LECs'
networks should no longer be made available to
competitors." Thus, state commissions now have a
more focused role in determining when an in-
cumbent LEC no longer has to unbundle a partic-
ular network element.
In 1996, Congress charged the Commission
with determining which parts of incumbent LEC
local telephone networks must be made available
at wholesale prices, or "unbundled," to new en-
trants, known as competitive LECs. 4 Section
251 (c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
("1996 Act") was designed to introduce competi-
tion into former local exchange monopolies by fa-
cilitating the entrance of competitive LECs that
could not otherwise afford to construct local net-
Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Ad-
vanced Telecommunications Capability, Report and Order and
Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC
Dkt. Nos. 01-338; 96-98; 98-147 (Aug. 21, 2003) [hereinafter
Triennial Review Order] ("Few, if any, other requirements of
the 1996 Act have attracted so much regulatory attention, in-
dustry effort, or litigation, however, as the requirements
under Section 251 (c) (3) that [incumbent LECs] make ele-
ments of their networks available on an unbundled basis to
new entrants as cost-based rates.") Id. at para. 2; Review of
the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competi-
tion Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, De-
ployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecom-
munications Capability, CC Dkt. Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd. 22781, 22794, para.
27 (2001) [hereinafter Triennial Review NPRM] (asking how
satellite, fixed wireless or mobile wireless should weigh in the
impairment analysis); see also Gayle Kansagor, et al., States to
Play Major Role Under FCC Order, TRDAILY, Aug. 23, 2003, at 7
(describing the Triennial Review Order's discussion of states
roles).
4 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (1996) (amending the Communications Act of
1934 codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (2000)
[hereinafter the Act].
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works from scratch into the market. 5 Without a
doubt, and as evidenced by seven non-stop years
of litigation at nearly every level of regulatory and
judicial fora, unbundling incumbent LEC net-
works has proven to be one of the most daunting
challenges the Commission has faced. Not only
must the Commission determine which parts of
the incumbents' networks, known as unbundled
network elements or "UNEs," can technically be
duplicated and to what extent such replication is
economically feasible, but the Commission is
forced to solve this equation in a fluid environ-
ment of rapidly changing technological develop-
ments and consumer demands.6 Moreover, the
evolution of technologies such as cable telephony,
improved wireless service, and satellite may affect
the analysis of whether consumers already have
sufficient competitive choices. 7
Armed with over seven years of unbundling ex-
perience, the Commission, in response to the
D.C. Circuit's USTA v. FCC decision, conducted a
more detailed "granular" review of local market
conditions in order to assess competitive LECs
ability to deploy or purchase from alternative
sources, each piece of the local network. In the
Triennial Review Order, the Commission found
that, in certain instances, state commissions are
able to gather more detailed evidence regarding
the ability of competitive LECs to obtain certain
UNEs in various customer and geographic mar-
kets. 8 Specifically, state public utility commissions
are now empowered to conduct detailed fact-find-
ing inquiries into the market conditions sur-
rounding three key parts of the network: local
loops serving large business customers, local cir-
cuit switching, and transport.9 These three UNEs
generally represent the bulk of competitive LEC
infrastructure deployment, and therefore present
the greatest likelihood that competitors may not
be impaired without unbundled access to these el-
ements.' 0 For the first time since 1996, the Coin-
5 SeeJoi rr STATEMENT OF MANAGERS, S. CONF. REP. No.
104-230, at 1 (2d Sess. 1996) (stating that the competitive
framework of the 1996 Act would benefit "all Americans by
opening all telecommunications markets to competition").
6 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 7 ("We
recognize that competition has evolved at a different pace in
different geographic markets and for different market seg-
ments."). Indeed, the proliferation of alternatives for con-
sumers, such as cable telephony, wireless, and xDSL technol-
ogies, have radically changed the equation for determining
whether there is competition in the. local market. See, e.g., id.
at para. 52 (stating that, as of mid-2002, cable telephony rep-
mission's record demonstrates that, in certain
cases, competitors are able to economically de-
ploy these facilities.
Section I of this article briefly summarizes the
Commission's significant post-1996 Act un-
bundling decisions, including a summary of the
Commission's most recent unbundling determi-
nations in the Triennial Review Order. Section II
examines the Commission's authority to delegate
to the states the authority to perform the fact-find-
ing inquiries needed to determine impairment
under the Commission's revised unbundling
rules. Section II also includes a broad discussion
of the ability of a federal agency to preempt the
states and an analysis of the Commission's author-
ity to require state action. Finally, Section III con-
siders the practical implications of the Commis-
sion's delegation to the states and considers some
of the issues that will likely be addressed in up-
coming appeals of the Triennial Review Order.1
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF UNBUNDLING
Section 251(d) (1) of the Act expressly grants
the Commission authority to establish regulations
implementing the requirements of the rest of Sec-
tion 251, including Section 251(c) (3)'s require-
ment that incumbent LECs provide access, to any
requesting telecommunications carrier, to their
networks on an unbundled basis.' 2 In addition, al-
though Section 251(d) (1) undoubtedly provides
the Commission with the authority to implement
unbundling regulations, the Act also preserves a
role for the states. Specifically, Section 251(d) (3)
of the Act permits states. to regulate unbundling
so long as the exercise of their authority does not
conflict with, or substantially prevent implementa-
tion of, the Commission's unbundling actions:
In prescribing and enforcing its regulations to imple-
ment the unbundling requirements . . . the Commis-
resented over 2.5 million access lines in 27 states); see also id.
at para. 53 (stating that, as of mid-2002, there were 129 mil-
lion wireless subscribers).
7 See id. at para. 228 (recognizing that cable and wireless
technologies are increasingly competitive with incumbent
LEC local services).
8 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 118.
9 See id. at paras. 187-88.
10 See generally id. at Parts VI.A (Loops), VI.C (Dedicated
Transport), VI.D (Local Circuit Switching).
I I See generally id. at paras. 3-6.
12 47 U.S.C. §251(d)(1) (2000).
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sion shall not preclude the enforcement of any regula-
tion, order, or policy of a State Commission that-
(A) establishes access and interconnection obliga-
tions of local exchange carriers;
(B) is consistent with the requirements of this sec-
tion; and
(C) does not substantially prevent implementation
of the requirements of this section and the pur-
poses of this part.'
A. The Local Competition Order
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 251(d) (1) of
the 1996 Act, the Commission created a national
list of network elements in the 1996 Local Competi-
tion Order that incumbent LECs must make availa-
ble to new entrants on an unbundled basis. 14 In
general, applying Section 251 (d) (2) (B)'s ambigu-
ous standard that competitors should have un-
bundled access to each piece of the incumbent
LEC's network that they would otherwise be "im-
paired" without, the Commission concluded that
competitive LECs would be impaired without ac-
cess to essentially the entire incumbent LEC net-
work.15 In addition to the national list, the Com-
mission delegated to the states the authority to ap-
ply the Commission's interpretation of Section
251 (d) (2)'s "necessary" and "impair" standards to
require incumbent LECs to unbundle additional
network elements beyond the Commission's mini-
mum national list.' 6 States, however, were not ex-
pressly denied the ability to take UNEs off the na-
13 Id. §251(d)(3). Section 252(e) (3) generally preserves
the state's authority to review interconnection agreements:
Notwithstanding paragraph (2), but subject to Section
253, nothing in this Section shall prohibit a State com-
mission from establishing or enforcing other require-
ments of State law in its review of an agreement, includ-
ing requiring compliance with intrastate telecommuni-
cations service quality standards or requirements.
Id. §252(e) (3). Similarly, Section 261 preserves state regula-
tions promulgated prior to, and after, the date of the Act,
provided that such requirements are "not inconsistent" with
the Act or the Commission's regulations. Id. §261(b)-(c).
14 See In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Dkt.
96-98, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499 (1996) [here-
inafter Local Competition Order] (subsequent history omitted);
47 U.S.C. §251(d)(1) (2000) ("Within 6 months after the
date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
the Commission shall complete all action necessary to estab-
lish regulations to implement the requirements of [Section
251]."); Id. §251(d)(2) (directing the Commission to per-
form the "necessary and impair" analysis to determine what
UNEs should be made available to competitive LECs).
15 AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999).
16 Local Competition Order, supra note 14, at 15641-42, pa-
ras. 281-82; see also 47 C.F.R. §51.317(a) and (b) (1996) (pro-
tional list. '7
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board considered whether the
Commission had the authority to implement the
local telecommunications provisions of the 1996
Act.' 8 The Court held Congress had given the
Commission the authority to implement the local
competition provisions of the 1996 Act, including
the unbundling requirements of Section 251.'1'
Specifically, the Court found that Congress
granted the Commission full authority to regulate
local telecommunications, even though, in doing
so, Congress had "taken the regulation of local
telecommunications competition away from the
states."20 The Court, however, vacated the Com-
mission's interpretation of the "impair" standard
of Section 251 (d) (2) because it found that the Lo-
cal Competition Order failed to include a "limiting
standard," and instead provided competitive LECs
with blanket access to the incumbent LECs' net-
works.2'
B. The UNE Remand Order
In response to the Supreme Court's remand, in
1999 the Commission adopted the UNE Remand
Order.22 In addition to refining its interpretation
of the 1996 Act's impairment standard to provide
that impairment exists where lack of access to a
particular UNE "materially diminishes" a competi-
viding that the state could decline to require unbundling of
the network element only if that network element did not
satisfy the applicable "necessary" or "impair" test).
17 See Local Competition Order, supra note 14, at 15566-68,
paras. 133-37.
18 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 374-75 (discussing the in-
cumbents' arguments that the authority to implement the lo-
cal competition provisions belonged, not to the Commission,
but to the states). Notably, no party challenged the Commis-
sion's conclusion that it could authorize the states to apply
those standards to require unbundling of additional network
elements under federal law. See Triennial Review Order, supra
note 3, at para. 182 (discussing the Iowa Utils. Bd. decision).
19 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 378.
20 Id. at 378 n.6; see alsoJonathan Galst, "Phony" Intent?:
An Examination of Regulatory-Preemption Jurisprudence, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 108, 150 (1992) (arguing that preemption de-
cisions should be reserved for "institutions that are politically
accountable and possess the necessary expertise").
21 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 388.
22 Implementation of the Local Competition Provision
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Dkt. 96-98, Third
Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696 (1999) [hereinafter UNE Remand Or-
der] (subsequent history omitted).
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tor's ability to provide service, the Commission
modified the language addressing the states' au-
thority to create additional unbundling require-
ments in two ways.23 First, the UNE Remand Order
clarified the set of standards that states should ap-
ply. In particular, the UNE Remand Order provided
that "[a] state commission must comply with the
standards set forth in §51.317 [the codified ver-
sion of the impairment standard] when consider-
ing whether to require the unbundling of addi-
tional network elements."
2 4
Second, the UNE Remand Order provided that al-
though states could not remove UNEs from the
Commission's national list, a state could remove
unbundling requirements for a network element
that the state itself had previously added.2 5 Signifi-
candy, however, the Commission found that at
the time, for several policy reasons, states should
only be permitted to supplement the national
UNE list.26 Specifically, the Commission reasoned
that removal of unbundling requirements on a
state-by-state basis would threaten, "at least in the
near future," certainty in the marketplace and the
development of competition. 27 Further, a guaran-
teed national list would provide competitive LECs
with the certainty to develop and implement re-
gional and national business plans.28 The Com-
mission also recognized that state-by-state review
of UNEs would lead to increased litigation at the
state level, which would unnecessarily burden the
parties with additional costs and delays. Most im-
23 See id. at 3725, para. 51 ("We find that a materiality
component, although it cannot be quantified precisely, re-
quires that there be substantive differences between the alter-
native outside the incumbent LEC's network and the incum-
bent LEC's network element that, collectively, 'impair' a
competitive LEC's ability to provide service.").
24 47 C.F.R. §51.317(b)(4) (2002).
25 See UNE Remand Order, supra note 22, at 3767, para.
154.
26 See id. ("We believe that section 251 (d) (3) grants state
commissions the authority to impose additional obligations
upon incumbent LECs beyond those imposed by the national
list, as long as they meet the requirements of section 251 and
the national policy framework instituted in this Order . ..
however, we find that state-by-state removal of elements from
the national list would substantially prevent implementation
of the requirements and purposes of this section."). Origi-
nally, in the 1996 Local Competition Order, the Commission
held that "[s]tate commissions may identify network ele-
ments to be unbundled, in addition to those elements identi-
fied by the Commission." Local Competition Order, supra note
14, at para. 136 (codified at 27 C.F.R. §51.317 (2003)).
27 UNE Remand Order, supra note 22, at 3768-69, para.
158.
28 See id. at 3769, para. 159.
portantly, however, the Commission did not fore-
close future state-by-state UNE consideration, but
instead premised its decision on present market
conditions. 29 Thus, the Commission clearly left
open the possibility of revisiting its nationwide
UNE policy.
It should be noted that, from a practical stand-
point, due to the UNE Remand Order's expansive
unbundling requirements, the policy of allowing
states to add only UNEs to the national list had
limited utility. Because virtually every piece of in-
cumbent LEC physical network was already un-
bundled under the Commission's rules, little was
left for the states to consider. These options in-
clude requiring incumbent LECs to offer "new"
unbundled loop-transport combinations, known
as "EELs," where previously competitors were re-
quired to first purchase a retail priced "special ac-
cess" circuit then convert that circuit to a UNE,
and unbundling switching in the few dense urban
areas where incumbent LECs were not otherwise
required to provide unbundled access to switch-
ing.3
0
C. United States Telecom Association v. FCC
On May 24, 2002, in United States Telecom Associa-
tion v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit addressed both the
UNE Remand Order and the Commission's rules re-
quiring the unbundling of line sharing. 3' The
USTA court found the Commission's analysis in
29 See id. at 3769-70, paras. 160-61.
: See, e.g., Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Oblig:-
tions of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementa-
tion of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offer-
ing Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Initial Com-
ments of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Com-
missioners, to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Dkt. Nos.
01-92, 96-98, 98-147, at 8 n. 16 (Apr. 5, 2002) [hereinafter
Comments to Triennial Review Order]; see also James M.
Tobin & Mary E. Wand, Competition in Local Telephone Services:
California's Experience in Implementation of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 791, 794-806 (1998) (dis-
cussing the California Public Utilities Commission's early
proceedings implementing the 1996 Act).
41 United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415
(D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. WorldCom, Inc. v.
United States Telecom Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 1571 (2003). Subse-
quent to the UNE Remand Order the Commission determined
that incumbent LECs must also unbundle the high-frequency
portion of the local loop to requesting carriers. Deployment
of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Dkt
Nos. 98-147, 96-98, Third Report and Order in CC Dkt. No. 98-
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the UNE Remand Order lacking in several respects,
the resolution of which implicates many aspects of
the Triennial Review proceeding. Specifically, with
regard to the Commission's unbundling rules, the
USTA court was concerned that the Commission's
rules were too national in scope, despite variation
in competitive conditions and revenue opportuni-
ties around the country. In finding fault with the
Commission's adoption of a "uniform national
rule" mandating nationwide access to most UNEs,
the USTA court held that Section 251 (d) (2) re-
quires "a more nuanced concept of impairment"
that takes into account possible variations in im-
pairment in different geographic and customer
markets.3 2 The USTA court, however, did not
question the authority of the Commission to or-
der nationwide unbundling rules-the court
questioned only the Commission's broad analysis
of the nationwide market conditions. 
3
D. The 7iennial Review Order
Charged by the D.C. Circuit in USTA with the
147 and Fourth Report in CC Dkt. No. 96-98, 14 FCC Rcd.
20912, 20916, para. 5 (1999) [hereinafter Line Sharing Order].
The court remanded the UNE Remand Order to the Commis-
sion for further consideration and stated that "the Line Shar-
ing Order must be vacated and remanded." USTA, 290 F.3d at
429. The USTA court faulted the Commission for failing to
consider the existence of intermodal competition in the mar-
ket for broadband services before requiring incumbents to
unbundle the high-frequency portion of the loop. See USTA,
290 F.3d at 428-29.
32 See USTA, 290 F.3d at 426.
33 See id. at 422 (reasoning that, without considering the
level of impairment in any particular geographic market and
customer class, the Commission's rules would result in UNEs
being "available to [competitive LECs] in many markets
where there is no reasonable basis for thinking that competi-
tion is suffering from any impairment of a sort that might
have the object of Congress's [sic] concern").
M See Tiennial Review NPRM, supra note 3, at 22815-16,
paras. 75-76. The Commission also considered and rejected
the argument that states have separate unbundling authority
tinder Section 271. Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at
para. 659 ("So if, for example, pursuant to section 251, com-
petitive entrants are found not to be 'impaired' without ac-
cess to unbundled switching at TELRIC rates, the question
becomes whether BOCs are required to provide unbundled
switching at TELRIC rates pursuant to section
271 (c) (2) (B) (vi)."). Section 271 sets out a checklist that re-
quires Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") to offer nondis-
criminatory access to, for example, local loops and switching
in order to receive authority to provide in-region interLATA
service. See 47 U.S.C. §271 (2000); see also United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub
nora., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (re-
stricting BOCs from providing service for calls between
task of analyzing customer and geographic mar-
kets on a far more detailed level to determine
whether unbundling should be required, the
Commission considered in the Triennial Review
proceeding the extent to which state commissions
can assist in analyzing local market conditions in
order to create, remove, and implement Un-
bundling requirements. 3 4 Most importantly, the
Triennial Review Order refines the Commission's in-
terpretation of Section 251 (d) (3)'s "impairment"
standard to consider the degree that competitive
LECs are "economically" hindered in entering the
local market.3 5 In addition to revising the impair-
ment standard from the UNE Remand Order's "ma-
terially diminish" standard to consideration of a
defined list of economic barriers to entry, the new
standard, forged by seven years of competitive
LEC experience, considers evidence of actual de-
ployment in the marketplace as proof that deploy-
ment is economically feasible.3" Evidence of ac-
tual marketplace deployment is the most persua-
sive evidence in the new impairment analysis with,
for example, the Commission basing findings of
LATAs). In rejecting arguments that BOCs should be treated
differently than non-BOC incumbent LECs when Section 251
unbundling requirements are lifted, the Commission rea-
soned that Congress "could not have intended the [Section
271] checklist to render section 251 itself superfluous." 7"r-
ennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 660. Nonetheless,
the Commission held that BOCs must continue to make the
checklist elements that are no longer unbundled under Sec-
tion 251 available, not at the TELRIC wholesale prices, but at
'just and reasonable" prices and on a nondiscriminatory basis
under Sections 201 and 202 of the 1996 Act. Id. at para. 664.
35 Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 84 ("We
find a requesting carrier to be impaired when lack of access
to an incumbent LEC network poses a barrier or barriers to
entry, including operational and economic barriers, that are
likely to make entry into a market uneconomic.").
36 By way of background, in the Triennial Review proceed-
ing, the BOCs generally argued that the states should have a
limited role and that the Commission should find nationwide
that competitive LECs are not impaired without access to
many existing unbundled network elements, particularly
switching, high-capacity loops, and dedicated transport. See
Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 192 n. 609 (re-
jecting incumbent LEC arguments that states are preempted
from regulating local telecommunications); see also id. at
para. 196 n. 619 (summarizing Verizon's argument that in-
creased state participation would create greater uncertainty
due to the establishment of differing state decisions). On the
other hand, the IXCs and competitive LECs advocated for an
expanded state role in the unbundling process and, specifi-
cally, that carriers are impaired without access to the ele-
ments listed above and all other existing elements. See id. at
para. 192 n. 610 (rejecting arguments that states may imple-




impairment on the number of competitors that
have deployed a certain type UNE in a geographic
market.3 7 In sum, the revised impairment analysis,
with its increased fact-finding requirements, is to
be applied by both the Commission and the states
to create a consistent set of unbundling regula-
tions that are tailored to the individual character-
istics of each customer and geographic market.
For certain UNEs, such as enterprise loops, cir-
cuit switching, and transport (and the other UNEs
such as shared transport and signaling networks
that are available only if circuit switching is un-
bundled) the Commission has asked the states to
conduct a granular fact-finding inquiry, under
specific deadlines, to determine whether impair-
ment exists.38 For other UNEs, such as mass mar-
ket loops, line sharing, and packet switching, the
Commission has made a final unbundling deter-
mination, and states may not increase or decrease
unbundling obligations with respect to those ele-
ments.39 Notably, in order to minimize customer
and market disruptions, where the Commission
has removed unbundled access to an incumbent
LEC facility that is presently unbundled, such as
line sharing, the Commission provides a transi-
tion mechanism to avoid customer and market
disruptions. 4° For example, although the Com-
mission has removed line sharing from the UNE
list, existing line sharing providers have up to
three years to continue to obtain customers at
wholesale rates. 41 After the three year period
runs, however, competitive LECs will either serve
their xDSL customers with the competitive LEC's
own facilities or develop a new business model.
42
The lynchpin of the states' role is the Commis-
37 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 93.
'38 See id. at para. 7 (summarizing the role of the states).
39 See id. (describing the unbundling determination for
each UNE).
40 See id. at para. 264. In order to prevent further disrup-
tion in the line sharing context, the Commission decided to
grandfather existing line sharing arrangements until the
Commission's next biennial review commencing in 2004. See
id.
41 See Triennial Review Order,; supra note 3, at para. 264.
42 See id. at para. 265.
43 See, e.g., id. at para. 328 (describing the triggers for lo-
cal loops serving enterprise customers). While the Triennial
Review Order undoubtedly will require the states and the Com-
mission to maintain an open dialogue, the Commission re-
jected the request of many state commissions to convene a
federal/state joint conference on unbundling requirements
pursuant to Section 410(b) of the 1996 Act before promul-
gating new rules. See id. at para. 187 n. 597. The Commis-
sion reasoned that convening a federal/state joint confer-
sion's "trigger" tests that the state commissions ap-
ply to determine whether competitive LECs are
impaired without access to a particular UNE.
43
Realizing the resources and the institutional
knowledge that states have of their respective cus-
tomer and geographic markets, the Commission
reasoned that, where a network element's inher-
ent economic characteristics differ based on a
geographic area or customer class served, the
states are better positioned to conduct a detailed
fact-finding inquiry to determine if these triggers
are met.44 One such trigger, for example, is con-
tained in the analysis of dedicated transport.
Under the transport triggers, states will make de-
tailed findings of the number of transport provid-
ers on each particular route.45 If a certain number
of competitive providers are present, or a certain
number of wholesale alternatives (other than the
competitive LEC) are available, then incumbent
LEC transport on that particular route will no
longer be unbundled.
46
In short, based on the D.C. Circuit's guidance
that the Commission magnify its analysis of local
market conditions to be more "granular," this new
impairment standard analysis considers several ad-
ditional "barriers to entry" that make competitive
entry in a particular market uneconomic. 47 More-
over, the Commission's new impairment analysis
not only considers supply-side factors such as scale
economies, sunk costs, and first mover advan-
tages, but also considers demand-side factors such
as the particular needs of the business market (re-
ferred to as the "Enterprise Market") and the resi-
dential market (referred to as the "Mass Mar-
ket") 48 Set out below are brief summaries of the
ence would unnecessarily delay the Commission's implemen-
tation of the USTA decision. See id.
44 See id. at para. 7.
45 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 394-
418; see also id. at para. 396 ("We conclude that a route-spe-
cific bright-line standard is more manageable for the parties
and administratively more practical [than a general analysis
of market power].").
46 As discussed below, due to the fact-intensive nature of
this analysis, an issue arises in the event that a state declines
to perform this analysis or does not perform it within the
specified period of time. If this happens, the Commission
may be required to perform the very analysis which it deter-
mined that it was not in the best position to conduct.
47 Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 7.
48 See id. at para. 75 (describing how economic factors
such as "sunk costs, scale economies, scope economies, abso-
lute cost advantages, capital requirements, first-mover advan-
tages, strategic behavior by the incumbents, product differen-
tiation, long-term contracts, and network externalities" act as
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Triennial Review Order's key UNE determinations
describing whether that UNE is available on an
unbundled basis, and what role the states play
with respect to that element:
49
" Mass Market Local Loops: All 2-wire and
4-wire analog and digital copper local
loops are unbundled. 5 11 "Hybrid" local
loops that are time division multiplexed
("TDM-based") are subject to unbundling.
5 *
Packet-switched loops are not unbundled.
52
Fiber-to-the-home loops are generally not
unbundled.
53
* Line Sharing:5 4 Unbundling of line sharing
is phased out over three years. 55 States gen-
erally have no role with regard to determin-
ing impairment for this UNE.
• Enterprise Market Local Loops: OCn level
local loops are no longer unbundled. 56 Dark
fiber loops, DS3 loops (limited to 2 DS3
loops per competitive LEC per customer lo-
cation) and DS1 loops are unbundled, ex-
cept where states determine that impair-
ment does not exist using the Commission's
barriers to entry).
49 For the sake of brevity, technical descriptions of the
functions of each UNE are omitted. Each of the three
landmark Commission orders discussed herein, the Local
Competition Order, the UATE Remand Order and the Triennial Re-
view Order, provide extensive discussion of each element's
function and its place in the local network architecture.
50 Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 249 (not-
ing that "no party seriously asserts that stand-alone copper
loops should not be unbundled in order to provide services
to the mass market"). Previously, the Commission declined
to incorporate distinctions based on loop-capacity levels in its
rules. UNE Remand Order, supra note 22, at 3777, para. 176.
The Triennial Review Order revises the local loop rules to in-
corporate several local loop categories, both based on gen-
eral capacity and make-up of the loop, for example, whether
certain parts of the loop are copper or fiber. See Triennial
Review Order, supra note 3, at paras. 197, 200.
51 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 213.
52 See id. at paras. 292-94. The Commission also con-
cluded, under its Section 706 analysis, that the costs of un-
bundling packet-switched local loops would outweigh the po-
tential benefits of unbundling. See id. at para. 295.
53 See id. at 273 (for fiber-to-the-home loops that have
been built over top of existing copper network (this is also
known as an overbuild or a brownfield build), incumbent
LECs must make available a copper loop or provide 64 kbps
channel over the fiber-to-the-home loop).
54 Line sharing occurs when the incumbent LEC offers
voice service to the customer, and the competitive LEC leases
the high frequency portion of the loop, typically to provide
xDSL service. See id. at para. 255. Arguably the two most
hotly contested UNEs in the Tiennial Review proceeding
were line sharing and circuit switching. Circuit switching was
controversial because it is the centerpiece of UNE platform
("UNE-P") providers, competitive LECs that represent a sig-
"triggers," i.e., states can remove these loops
if the triggers are met.57 States must conduct
this inquiry within nine months of the
effective date of the Triennial Review Order.
5
1
" Subloops: Incumbent LECs must offer na-
tional unbundled access to subloops neces-
sary to access wiring at or near multiunit
customer premises..5 9 This requirement in-
cludes inside wire and applies to all types of
capacity level and loops.60
o Network Interface Devices ("NIDs"): Incum-
bent LECs must offer unbundled access to
NIDs on a stand-alone basis to competitive
LECs. 6 1 States generally have no role with
regard to determining impairment for this
UNE.
o Dedicated Transport: Transport is redefined
to include only transmission facilities that
connect incumbent LEC switches and wire
centers-entrance facilities/backhaul be-
tween incumbent LEC end office and com-
peting LEC points of presence are not un-
nificant portion of the competitive LEC industry amounting
to approximately 7.5 million lines in 2002. See id. at para. 41
n. 130 (describing UNE-P as a combination of the loop,
switching, and shared transport UNEs). Generally, without
local circuit switching, UNE-P providers would either have to
deploy their own switch or purchase switching from another
provider. For practical purposes, line sharing was controver-
sial because the removal of it as a UNE greatly alters the busi-
ness plans of competitive LECs that focus on xDSL. Without
the ability to acquire the high frequency portion of the in-
cumbent LECs' local loops, these companies argued that
they would be unable to either build the lines themselves or
purchase the element from a wholesale source. See id. at
para. 255.
55 Line splitting, which is where two competitive LECs
split the loop into narrowband and broadband services, must
be supported by the incumbent LEC. See id. at para. 211.
56 See id. at para. 315. The Commission found persuasive
the fact that competitive LECs have actually deployed OCn
loops to commercial buildings. See id. Also, the Triennial Re-
view record shows that "there does not appear to be any evi-
dence of demand for incumbent LEC OCn level unbundled
loops." See id. at para. 315.
57 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at paras. 298-
342. The Commission's triggers consider, among other fac-
tors, whether self-provisioning is feasible, as evidenced by ex-
isting deployment by competitive LECs, and whether whole-
sale alternatives other than the incumbent LEC are available.
The Commission's rules provide when specific numbers of
each of these alternatives are available, then that loop-type is
no longer unbundled in that market.
58 See id. at para. 339.
59 See id. at para. 347.
60 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at paras. 343-
57.
61 See id. at paras. 356-58.
20041
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
bundled.6 OCn level transport is no longer
unbundled. 6- Dark fiber, DS3 (DS3s are lim-
ited to twelve per competitive LEC per
route) and DS1 facilities are unbundled, ex-
cept where states determine that, on a route-
by-route basis, impairment does not exist us-
ing the Commission's "triggers," i.e., states
can remove transport if the triggers are
met. 64 States must conduct this inquiry
within nine months of the effective date of
the Triennial Review Order.65 Once the initial
state proceedings are completed, states may
conduct further reviews to identify addi-
tional transport routes that satisfy the trig-
gers. 6
6
" Circuit Switching for the Enterprise Market:
Circuit switching at the DS1 and above ca-
pacity levels is no longer unbundled for cus-
tomers served by DS1 capacity and above
loops. 6 7 States, however, may rebut this find-
ing and require unbundling of enterprise
switching. 68 States must perform this inquiry
within ninety days of effective date of the
Triennial Review Order.69 States must make an
affirmative finding of impairment in a par-
ticular market and petition the Commission
for a waiver of the finding of no impair-
ment.
70
" Circuit Switching for the Mass Market: Cir-
cuit switching at the DSO level remains un-
bundled on a nationwide basis. 7' States,
however, may remove the unbundling re-
quirements in markets where incumbent
LECs are able to transfer mass quantities of
loops (referred to as a "batch hot cut
62 See id. at para. 365 (finding that Section 251 "does not
require incumbent LECs to unbundle transmission facilities
connecting incumbent LEC networks to competitive LEC
networks for the purpose of backhauling traffic").
63 See id. at para. 359.
64 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 359.
The transport triggers generally parallel the loop triggers in
that the state commission must consider both potential de-
ployment, by analyzing the number of competitive LECs that
have built facilities over that route, and the availability of
competitive wholesale providers. See id. at paras. 405, 412.
65 See id. at para. 417.
66 See id. at para. 418 (noting States have six months from
the filing of a petition to complete these further reviews).
67 See id. at paa. 419. The UNE Remand Order set out a
"carve-out" whereby circuit switching serving four-line DSO
customers in zone one of a top 50 MSA was not unbundled.
INE Remand Order, supra note 22, at 3828-31, paras. 290-98.
The Triennial Review Order maintains this requirement on an
interim basis whereby state commissions must determine
process"), or where states determine that
such a process is unnecessary, i.e., competi-
tive LECs could economically deploy switch-
ing even without a batch hot cut process in
place.7 2 States must conduct this inquiry
within nine months of the Triennial Review
Order.7 3 States may also remove mass market
circuit switching where certain triggers are
met (similar to loops and transport) .7
Lastly, states may consider whether tempo-
rary availability of mass market switching
cures impairment, e.g., a state may consider
if the availability of unbundled switching to
the competitive LEC for the first ninety days
it has the customer is enough to cure im-
pairment, rather than leaving mass market
circuit switching unbundled for the indefi-
nite future.
75
* Shared Transport: Remains unbundled, but
only to the extent circuit switching remains
unbundled.7" Thus, the states' decisions for
the circuit switching UNE control whether
shared transport is unbundled.
* Packet Switching: No longer unbundled. 77
This applies to packet switching, routers,
and Digital Subscriber Line Access Mul-
tiplexers ("DSLAMs") .7 States generally
have no role with regard to determining im-
pairment for this UNE.
* Signaling Networks: Unbundled, but only
where a competitive LEC purchases circuit
switching. 79 Other than the connection with
circuit switching, states generally have no
role with regard to determining impairment
for this UNE.
within nine months, by applying Commission triggers,
whether these customers could economically be served by a
DS1 or higher capacity loop. Id. at para. 525.
68 Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 455.
69 See id. States may also revisit whether competitive
LECs are impaired without access to unbundled local circuit
switching serving the enterprise market; these subsequent re-
views must be completed within six months of the filing of a
petition. See id.
70 See id.
71 See id. at para. 459.
72 See id. at paras. 459, 488, 506-07.
73 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 488.
74 See id. at paras. 498-505.
75 See id. at para. 521.
76 See id. at paras. 533-34.
77 See id. at para. 537.
78 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 537.
79 See id. at paras. 542-45.
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* Call-Related Databases: Unbundled if the
competitive LEC also purchases unbundled
switching.8 0 Also, if the incumbent LEC
does not provide customized routing, then
operator services and directory assistance
services are also available. 8 ' Other than the
connection with circuit switching, states gen-
erally have no role with regard to determin-
ing impairment for this UNE.
* Operations Support Systems ("OSS")
Functions: OSS generally consists of
pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, main-
tenance and repair, and billing functions
supported by the incumbent LEC.8 2 OSS is
unbundled nationwide for qualifying ser-
vices.
8 3
" UNE Combinations: Loop-transport combi-
nations (known as enhanced extended
links, or "EELs") are unbundled, subject to
that circuit meeting certain service eligibility
criteria.84 Competitive LECs may convert
special access services to EELs and may also
purchase new EELs.8 5
II. THE COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY TO
RESTRICT AND DELEGATE STATE
UNBUNDLING
Several challenges lie ahead for the Commis-
sion's Triennial Review rules. Significantly, courts
will likely be forced to consider whether the Com-
mission has the authority to preempt the states
from employing their own impairment triggers.
80 See id. at para. 551.
81 See id. at para. 560. The Commission also held that
customized routing must be provided in a manner that allows
competitive LECs to "efficiently access" either the competi-
tive LEC's or a third party's Operator Service/Directory Assis-
tance platform. See id. at para. 560 n. 1735.
82 See id. at para. 561.
83 See Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 566.
84 See id. at para. 575. In order to obtain an EEL, a com-
petitive LEC must have state authorization to provide local
voice service, local voice service must be provide over each
circuit, including local number assignment and E911 capabil-
ity, and various architectural safeguards must be met that
generally ensure that the EEL is not used to circumvent spe-
cial access services. See id. at paras. 590-611.
85 See id. at paras. 569-626. Formerly EELs were typically
obtained by first purchasing a special access circuit then con-
verting that circuit to an EEL, thus reducing the cost for that
circuit, but also incurring a penalty to cancel the special ac-
cess contract.
86 Chairman Powell and Commissioner Abernathy both
ask, in their separate statements to the Triennial Review Order,
whether these factors are adequately defined for the local cir-
To date, the Triennial Review Order represents the
Commission's most rigorous and defined set of
procedures regarding UNEs that states must
follow. That is, states choosing to participate in
the UNE analysis may only, under the Commis-
sion's rules, consider a defined set of factors in
reaching their determinations.8 6 Below is a discus-
sion of the Commission's authority, as a federal
agency acting on congressionally delegated au-
thority, to preempt the states from deviating from
the Commission's defined fact-finding tests.
A. General Preemption Authority of Federal
Agencies.
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Con-
stitution provides Congress with the power to pre-
empt state law.8 7 In Louisiana Public Service Commis-
sion v. FCC, the Supreme Court set out the analysis
for determining whether Congress or a federal
agency has lawfully preempted state authority.88
Generally, preemption of state law occurs where
"Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses
a clear intent to pre-empt state law."8 9 Further,
"pre-emption may result not only from action
taken by Congress itself; a federal agency acting
within the scope of its congressionally delegated
authority may pre-empt state regulation." 90
B. Commission Authority Under the 1996 Act
to Create Nationwide Unbundling Rules.
Section 201(b), a 1938 amendment to the
cuit switching UNE. See generally Triennial Review Order, supra
note 3, Separate Statements of Commissioners Michael K.
Powell and Kathleen Q. Abernathy in CC Dkt. Nos. 01-338,
96-98, 98-147, FCC 03-36 (Aug. 21, 2003).
87 U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2 ("the Laws of the United
States . .. shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
88 Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355
(1986) (addressing the Commission's authority, prior to
1996, to preempt state regulation over depreciation of prop-
erty for intrastate rate making purposes).
89 See id. at 368. Congress may also preempt state author-
ity,
[w]here there is outright or actual conflict between fed-
eral and state law, compliance with both federal and
state law is in effect physically impossible, where there is
implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation,
where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus oc-
cupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no
room for the States to supplement federal law, where or
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-





Communications Act of 1934, confers rulemaking
authority on the Commission: "The Commission
may prescribe such rules and regulations as may
be necessary in the public interest to carry out the
provisions of this chapter."91 The 1996 Act left
this Section intact and in Iowa Utils. Bd., the Su-
preme Court held that Section 201 (b) explicitly
gives the Commission jurisdiction to make rules
governing matters to which the 1996 Act ap-
plies.9 2 As discussed above, the Iowa Utils. Bd.
Court upheld the Commission's authority to
create pricing rules, emphasizing that there can
be no question "whether the Federal Government
has taken the regulation of local telecommunica-
tions competition away from the states .. . [be-
cause] it unquestionably has."93 Although he dis-
agreed that the Commission had been given clear
authority to create pricing rules, Justice Thomas,
in his concurring opinion, explained: "Section
251 specifically identifies those subjects upon
which the Commission may regulate. The Com-
mission has authority to regulate . .. those net-
work elements that the carrier must make availa-
ble on an unbundled basis for purposes of
§251 (c)."
9 4
In Iowa Utils. Bd., numerous parties challenged
the Commission's TELRIC rule arguing that it dis-
placed the states' authority to "establish" or ap-
prove rates in arbitration proceedings under the
1996 Act.9 5 The Supreme Court, however, upheld
the TELRIC rule as a legitimate exercise of the
Commission's rulemaking authority under Sec-
tion 201 (b) of the Act.96 Specifically, the Court
held that the Commission has broad jurisdiction
91 47 U.S.C. §201 (b) (2000).
92 See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 377-78.
93 Id. at 378 (holding that state application of the Com-
mission's pricing methodology "is enough to constitute the
establishment of rates"). Cf John E. Taylor, AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utilities Board: The Supreme Court Recognizes Broad FCC Ju-
risdiction Over Local Telephone Competition, 78 N.C. L. REv.
1645, 1698 (2000) (arguing that "textual analysis slightly fa-
vors the conclusion that the state commissions should be free
to develop their own pricing methodologies under the 1996
Act").
94 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 406.
95 See id. at 382; see also Michael L. Gallo, AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utilities Board, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 417, 423-24 (argu-
ing that establishing rates "could be interpreted to mean
merely implementing the FCC's mandatory pricing policy").
96 See Iowa Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. at 385 (holding that
"the Commission has jurisdiction to design a pricing
methodology").
97 See id.
98 Id. at 413 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
under the 1996 Act to prescribe a pricing method-
ology that the states could then take and "estab-
lish" rates by applying and implementing the
TELRIC methodology.
97
Similarly, the key issue in the Triennial Review
proceeding is whether the Commission has the
authority to restrict the analysis that the states will
apply to add or remove UNEs in light of Section
251 (d) (3) which preserves state authority to "es-
tablish" unbundling obligations. 98 Here, as in
Iowa Utils. Bd., the Commission has prescribed a
methodology that the states will use to reach cer-
tain conclusions, i.e., establish unbundling deter-
minations, by conducting detailed fact-finding in-
quiries. With unbundling, as in the pricing rules
at issue in Iowa Utils. Bd., the statute reserves the
"establish" function for the states. 99 As Justice
Thomas noted, however, the key difference with
unbundling is that, via Sections 251(c) and (d),
the Commission has clear authority to prescribe
unbundling rules. 10 0 Thus, because the Commis-
sion's pricing rules were upheld, even in light of
the fact that states traditionally exercised plenary
authority over pricing, it follows, afortiori, that the
Commission's explicit statutory authority to im-
plement unbundling allows it to both limit state
unbundling activity, which cannot be said to be a
traditional state function, and to prescribe spe-
cific guidelines for the states' analysis that is con-
sistent with the Commission's overall implementa-
tion of Section 251.101
The remaining issue then is whether the Com-
mission may require the states to perform an un-
bundling analysis, or whether the Commission
Commission was stripping states of a "traditional local
ratemaking" function). Here, unbundling is not a traditional
function of the states-prior to the creation of the competi-
tive local market by the 1996 Act, unbundling generally did
not exist.
99 47 U.S.C. §251 (d) (3).
100 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 406-07.
101 47 U.S.C. §251 (d) (3); see also Triennial Review Order,
supra note 3, at para. 187 (finding that the states "do not have
plenary authority under federal law to create, modify or elim-
inate unbundling obligations"); see also Gallo, supra note 95,
at 419. (discussing the authority that state public utility com-
missions traditionally held over the regulation of intrastate
telecommunications services). Previously, the Commission
and the states engaged in limited sharing in the context of
cable regulation. Arthur H. Harding & Paul W. Jamieson,
Dismantling the Final Regulatory Entry Barriers: A Cal for the FCC
to Assert Its Preemptive Authority, 12 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 533,
555 (1999) (describing the Commission's recognition in the




may only request that the states perform the
analysis. 102 Generally, a state's participation in car-
rying out federal telecommunications regulation
is not mandatory. 0 3 For example, if a state com-
mission declines or fails to participate in arbitra-
tion or review of interconnection agreements, re-
sponsibility for regulation falls to the Commis-
sion. That is, there is no requirement or obliga-
tion in federal law that a state participate in this
regulation. Further, a state or state commission's
decision not to act is generally not subject to re-
view.10 4 The state commission is "free to accept or
reject such participation as a gratuity without
abstaining from any lawful activity within its
power."10 5 A state commission may simply decline
the invitation to regulate local competition on be-
half of the federal government and allow that
power to return to the Commission. 0 6 In sum,
while Congress can obtain a state's voluntary con-
sent to federal jurisdiction, Congress cannot
"commandeer" state regulatory agencies. '0 7
Indeed, courts have recognized that Congress
"certainly can invite the states to act on its behalf
in carrying out [the 1996 Act].""'° Congress, how-
ever, cannot force the state commission to act. In
Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the federal government's authority to re-
quire state action.' 0 9 Printz involved the federal
government directing, through the Brady Act,
state law enforcement officers to administer a fed-
eral regulatory scheme whereby local officers
were ordered to perform background checks for
gun purchases. 110 The Court held that "the
102 Generally, as discussed more fully below, because not
all state commissions may have jurisdiction to mandate un-
bundling, due to lack of authority in their enabling statutes,
there is a risk that a particular state may never actually con-
duct a UNE review.
103 See MCI v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 343
(7th Cir. 2000) ("Because the state commissions are given a
choice whether to participate in federal regulation, the Act
cannot be said impermissibly to 'commandeer' state regula-
tory agencies to enforce federal law.").
104 See47 U.S.C. §252(e) (6) (providing that an aggrieved
party's only remedy if the state commission fails to act is to
pursue its challenge to the agreement with the Commission).
If, however, the state commission makes a determination,
then that decision may be appealed to the appropriate fed-
eral district court. See id.
105 See AT&T v. BellSouth, 238 F.3d 636, 646 (5th Cir.
2001) (stating that the "Act permissibly offers state regulatory
agencies a limited mission, which they may accept or decline:
to apply federal law and regulations as arbitrators and ancil-
lary regulators within the federal system and on behalf of
Congress").
Federal Government may not compel the States to
'implement,' by legislation or executive action,
federal regulatory programs."'" More precisely,
"[t]he Federal Government may neither issue di-
rectives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the states' officers, or
those of their political subdivisions, to administer
or enforce a federal regulatory program."' 12 The
Court reasoned that the Brady Act violated the
constitutional system of dual sovereignty, i.e., the
Constitution empowers only the president to exe-
cute the laws, and Congress generally cannot
force state governments to absorb the financial
burden of implementing a federal regulatory pro-
gram. Thus, under Printz, while the Commission
may request the state commission to act, it does
not appear that the Commission may order either
state commissions or state legislatures to promul-
gate or implement any additional unbundling
rules.
III. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, for those elements which
the Commission cannot conduct a sufficiently
granular analysis, the Triennial Review Order sets
out interim rules that remain effective until the
states, if willing, complete their own granular
fact-finding inquiries using the Commission's trig-
ger tests. Because the Commission, however, can
only define the boundaries of state unbundling ef-
forts, and cannot require the states to act, there
are at least three potential outcomes (assuming
106 For example, the Virginia state commission has de-
clined to resolve petitions to interpret and enforce intercon-
nection agreements, thus requiring the Commission to enter-
tain regulatory responsibility over these disputes. See
Starpower Communications, LLC Petition for Preemption of
Jurisdiction of the Virginia State Corporation Commission
Pursuant to Section 252(e)(5) of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd.
11277 (2000); see generally Kristin Calabrese, Does State Partici-
pation in Regulation Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act Con-
stitute a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1127
(2002) (discussing the Supreme Court's preference for find-
ing sovereign immunity in the context of appeals of state ar-
bitration decisions).
107 See MCI, 222 F.3d at 343.
108 See, e.g., id. at 343 (recognizing the role of the states
as a "deputized" federal regulator).
1o9 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).
110 See id. at 902-03.
111 See id. at 925-26.
112 Id. at 935 (citations omitted).
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the Commission's rules withstand judicial scru-
tiny). First, if the Commission finds, with respect
to a certain UNE, that impairment exists nation-
wide, then there is nothing left for the states to
decide regarding that UNE, e.g., residential ana-
log voice loops remain unbundled. Incumbent
LECs seeking to remove unbundling require-
ments for these UNEs must wait until the Com-
mission's next UNE review proceeding. Second,
if the Commission finds nationwide impairment
does not exist (in the case of mass market switch-
ing), or exists (in the case of enterprise loops and
transport), and the state rebuts these findings,
then parties believing that a particular state un-
bundling determination is inconsistent with the
limits of Section 251(d) (3) and the Commission's
rules, may seek a declaratory ruling from the
Commission seeking to require the states to
amend their decisions to conform with the Com-
mission's. 113 Third, if the states refuse to act,
then parties may petition the Commission to take
the place of the state. In this case, the Commis-
sion will perform the granular fact-finding analy-
sis.
1 1 4
The third outcome, with the Commission con-
ducting, for example, route-by-route transport in-
quiries, has the potential to create a significant
burden on the Commission, particularly because
many states have several incumbent LEC territo-
ries with each territory containing wide ranging
customer market characteristics. At the end of
the day, however, this possibility is unlikely given
that the states heavily lobbied the Commission
during the Triennial Review proceeding for an in-
creased role in unbundling. That is, based on
their stated willingness to enter the fray, particu-
larly with regard to consideration of local circuit
1 13 Although the Triennial Review Order does not use the
term "presumptively" to describe its rebuttable findings of
impairment, Chairman Powell, in his dissent, disagrees with
the Commission's finding that hot cut switching is "presump-
tively broken." Triennial Review Order, supra note 3, at 5 (sepa-
rate Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell).
114 An additional potential delay in state action arises in
the context of state commissions that have not been given
the express authority under their respective enabling acts to
order unbundling. In these cases, the outcome may depend
on whether the enabling legislation is sufficiently ambiguous
so as not to prevent the state commission from implementing
unbundling proceedings. See PhilipJ. Weiser, Towards a Con-
stitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REv.
663, 679-80 (2001) (discussing "whether state agencies
should be presumptively authorized to implement federal
law where state enabling legislation is otherwise ambiguous
switching, it appears likely that the states will not
hesitate to conduct their own Triennial Review pro-
ceedings. 1 15
Undoubtedly, the courts will be forced to con-
sider the validity of every provision of the Trien-
nial Review Order, including the Commission's re-
finement of the impairment standard interpreta-
tion. Indeed, one need look no further than the
Chairman's dissent to the Triennial Review Order
for a laundry list of issues that the courts will con-
sider.11 6 Only after the courts have resolved (1)
whether the Commission has properly interpreted
the Act's impairment standard; (2) whether the
Commission has reached reasonable conclusions
regarding whether impairment exists on a nation-
wide level; and (3) whether the Commission must
perform the granular analysis itself or may dele-
gate the authority to the states to both add and
remove UNEs, will industry participants have the
certainty that they have desperately sought since
1996. Moreover, these issues must be determined
in this order because the new impairment stan-
dard is the foundation for both the Commission's
conclusions and the forthcoming state proceed-
ings. Only after the impairment standard is up-
held will the courts be able to consider the validity
of the Commission's delegation of a detailed
fact-finding role to the states.
Lastly, the courts will likely address whether the
Commission's instructions to the states are suffi-
ciently precise so that the states can perform the
requisite analysis. Prior to the Triennial Review Or-
der, states had relatively unfettered authority to re-
quire additional unbundling of UNEs, but not to
remove UNEs from the Commission's national
list. I
7 Moreover, before the Triennial Review Or-
der, the Commission provided little guidance for
on the topic").
115 See Gayle Kansagor & Margaret Boles, NARUC Task
Force Forges Ahead with 'Triennial Review' Analysis, TRDAILy,
Aug. 23, 2003, at 6 (describing various state commissions' ef-
forts to open proceedings consistent with the Triennial Review
Order).
116 See generally Triennial Review Order, supra note 3 (sepa-
rate Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell criticizing
the majority's findings with regard to mass market switching
and unbundling for ignoring record evidence). In addition
to the appeals of the Triennial Review Order itself, the Commis-
sion's resources will also be taxed by appeals of its eventual
pre-emption decisions. Harding &Jamieson, supra note 101,
at 557-58 (arguing that federal courts should defer to swift
Commission assessment and adjudication of preemption pe-
titions).
117 See, e.g., Comments to Triennial Review Order, supra note
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the states other than two flawed interpretations of
the impairment standard that were rejected by the
Iowa Utils. Bd. and USTA courts. Now, in the inter-
est of creating certainty that will stabilize the in-
dustry, bring renewed investment, and increase
sustained competition, the Commission has pro-
vided tests that are intended to be administra-
tively practical for states to apply.'I18 In doing so,
states will conduct proceedings that reveal actual
deployment with regard to the particular markets,
30, at 8 n.16 (describing the additional unbundling proceed-
ings of several state commissions).
I 18 See, e.g., 7iennial Review Order, supra note 3, at para. 6.
'19 See Mark P. Trinchero & Holly Rachel Smith, Federal
Preemption of State Universal Service Regulations Under the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 303, 317-18
(1999) (describing the history of the Commission's preemp-
routes, and equipment that competitive LECs are
employing. Thus, regardless of the outcome of
any appeals, these state inquiries may very well
produce state records that show a clearer, more
"granular" picture of the local market." 9 Ulti-
mately, armed with such a record, the Commis-
sion would be far better prepared at the outset of
either the next scheduled review of its rules or any
remand from the courts.
tion of universal service Linder Section 254). Under Section
254, the Commission has established an explicit mandatory
federal universal mechanism that does not preclude the crea-
tion of state universal service funds. See, e.g., Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Senice, Ninth Report and Order and
Eighteenth Order on Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd. 20432 (1999),
rev'd, Qwest Corp. v. F.C.C., 258 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2001).
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